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Abstract
The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially origining from negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and
harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic
relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However,
this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lack supports of scientific evidences. Because ethic group
and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory,
this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict
based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: 1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a positive
association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; 2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it
also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; 3) the average frequencies
of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Ethnic groups, a named social group of people based on what is perceived as shared ancestry, cultural traditions,
communicational interaction, and history, are the primary entities to provide human’s basic needs[1]. However, the
ethnic group identity, i.e. ethnic identity(dividing the world into categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’[2]), may result in
long-term and destructive conflicts between different groups[2, 3]. Kelman et al. pointed out that moral exclusion of
ethnic identity, in the extreme, may result in ethnic cleansing and genocide[4, 5]. Rupesinghe and Burton concurred
that most ethnic conflicts involved inconsistence of identity[6, 7]. Further, the ethnic identity may evolve into ethnic
separatism in multi-ethnic countries, which may lead to ethnic conflicts between ethnic groups or even divide a country
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into new sovereign territories, such as the Yugoslav wars and Sudan’s Darfur conflict etc.. China- a country with 56
ethnic groups, has been threated by the force of ethnic separatism and ethnic conflicts for many years[8, 9]. Chinese
scholars have conducted many related works on the solution of ethnic conflicts and the elimination of negative effect
of ethnic identity[10, 11, 12]. Most of those scholars concured a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by
popularizing civic identity. Because civic identity leads people to tolerate others despite of other people’s ethnicity
[13, 14]. However, this viewpoint was only discussed based on philosophy, and it required sufficient evidences to
convince people.
Current papers conducted lots of eminent and significant works on explaining social phenomenon by evolution-
ary theory. For examples, P. James and D. Goetze explained ethnic conflict and ethnic formation by evolutionary
theory[15, 16]; Bester and Guth explained altruistic preferences by evolutionary game theory[17]; Rajiv Sethi and E.
Somanathan explained reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence by evolutionary game theory[18]; Choi
and Samuel studied the relation of parochial altruism and war by evolutionary simulation[19].
Inspired by these remarkable works[15, 16, 17, 18, 19], in this paper we try to test the viewpoint ‘ethnic harmony
could be promoted by popularizing civic identity’ and explore a possible way for the solution of conflicts by a scientific
method- based on evolutionary game simulation. To meet this goal, we firstly map the related concepts(such as ethnic
group, ethnic identity, civic identity behaviors etc.) to corresponding concepts in evolutionary game theory. Then
we establish a model to simulate the relationship between ethnic conflicts and civic identity. We carried out this
model for 30 times. The simulation results indicate that ethnic conflicts will not die out by cleaning all the ethnic
identity members once and for all, though the number of individuals with civic identity has a negative association
with the frequencies of conflicts. Moreover, the frequencies of conflicts cannot be reduced just by increasing the
number of individuals with civic identity, because the frequencies will bound back quickly or even higher. However,
it is possible to control the ethnic conflicts within a low level by promoting the ratio of civic identity individuals
persistently/periodly.
2. Method
Based on the current studies on ethnology, evolutionary game theory, and Choi and Samuel’s model, we illustrated
the relationship of ethnic identity, civic identity and ethnic conflicts by evolutionary game theory.
In this section, firstly we give the foundations to research ethnic conflicts with evolutionary game theory(see
section 2.1). Secondly, we elaborate how to map concepts in ethnology to concepts in evolutionary game theory(see
section 2.2). Thirdly we show how to establish a evolutionary game model to simulate the relation of civic identity
and ethnic conflicts(see section 2.3).
2.1. The Foundations to study ethnic conflict by evolutionary game theory
Ethnic groups are shaped by environment, mobility and cultural transmission etc.. Further, ethnic identity comes
from cumulative changes of the environment or the evolved mental capacities over years[16]. That’s to say, both
ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution[15]. Owing to the evolution, people with the same ethnic
identity tend to cooperate intensely with ingroups and to be hostile toward outgroups[15]. On the contrast, members
with a sense of civic identity will risk their lives to protect national interests, and help people without considering
their ethnic group, race, or class etc[20]. As the outcome of evolution is to promote individual and group interests(i.e.
improving inclusive fitness), some individuals may sacrifice their own well-being and reproductive potential to fight
for resources and interests of their group.
All of these behaviors are the game strategies(parochialism and tolerationism strategy etc.) from the perspective
of game theory. According to these strategies, groups may cooperate or evoke conflicts with other groups, and both
cases are the results of game between ethnic groups. From this perspective, we can simulate ethnic conflicts with
evolutionary game theory.
2.2. Mapping ethnology to evolutionary game theory
To simulate ethnic conflicts by evolutionary game theory, we map the related ethnological concepts to correspond-
ing concepts in evolutionary game theory. The mapping is presented as Fig.1. On the level of inter-group, we map
ethnic and civic identity to parochialism and tolerance strategy respectively. On the level of intra-group, we map the
2
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spirit of self-sacrifice and selfish to altruism and non-altruism strategy respectively. So each individual has four kinds
of strategies: parochial altruism, parochial nonaltruism, tolerant altruism, tolerant nonaltruism.
  Ethnic groups
 Ethnic identity 
  Civic identity 
  Self-sacri¿ce
   Self-interest
Ethnology
Groups
         Parochialism 
    Tolerance 
  Altruism 
        Nonaltruism
Evolutionary game theory
Maps  to
Figure 1. The mapping from concepts in ethnology to concepts in evolutionary game theory
2.3. Establishing the evolutionary game simulation model
The same as the previous studies, we use the GA(Genetic Algorithm) to simulate the evolutionary process. We
represent the four types of strategies as two alleles. Therefore, there are four genotypes: parochial altruists(abbr.PA),
tolerant altruism (abbr.TA), parochial nonaltruism(abbr.PN), and tolerant nonaltruism (abbr.TN). Moreover, individu-
als with genotype P(PA or PN)- abbreviated as P individuals, are hostile toward other groups, while T individuals(TA
or TN) are friendly to outgroups. Similarly, A individuals(PA or TA) contribute interests to the public within one
group, while N individuals(PN or TN) do not contribute interests but grab from A individuals in the group. When a
conflict occurs between two groups, only PA individuals engage in conflict, because the N individuals are not willing
to sacrifice to benefit their fellow group members. Yet, when two groups are in peace status, T individuals benefit
from the cooperated group according to the payoff table.
Furthermore, our evolutionary game model includes four parts: initialization, inter-group interaction, intra-group
interaction and update. The model is shown as Fig.2.
2.3.1. The initialization
To illustrate the association between civic identity and the frequency of ethnic conflict, the ratio of T individuals
and ethnic conflicts need to be calculated in the simulations. Initialization with too many(or too few) T individuals
or uneven distribution of genotypes may lead to the statistical error in the simulations. To avoid this initial statistical
error, we initialize each group individuals m with four genotypes randomly.
2.3.2. The inter-group interaction
In the step of inter-group interaction, a conflict occurs between two arbitrary groups i and j with probability
|pi j| (where pi j = f PAi − f PAj is the difference between f PAi and f PAj , which are parochial altruists in group i and
j respectively). PA individuals are fighters for their group. So the more PA individuals one group has, the greater
probability this group wins a conflict, and the smaller chance the opponent group wins. If pi j > 0(i.e. group i has more
PA fighters than group j), group i has a great probability to win a conflict. Here, we set group i winning a conflict
with probability 0.5 + 0.5pi j. Meanwhile, group i will not win the conflict with a probability 0.5 − 0.5pi j, i.e., lose
or tie. We set the losing probability and the tie probability equivalently, i.e, both are 0.25 − 0.25pi j. These values of
probability are vice verse for pi j < 0. If pi j = 0(i.e. the equal number of PA individuals in two groups), the conflict
ends with a tie. The probability distribution when pi j > 0 is listed in table 1.
If group i wins in the conflict, a ratio d of fighters(PA individuals) in both groups i and j die, and a ratio e of the
surviving fighters and nonfighters of the losing group j are killed. Yet only fighters in both groups are eliminated when
the conflict ends in a draw. The eliminated individuals in both groups are populated by offspring produced by randomly
selected parents in the winning group. Then the two reconstructed groups’ benefits are calculated respectively by the
3
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Figure 2. The evolutionary game model
payoff table(table 2). However, if the two groups are in a harmony status, each T individual in group i will receive
cooperating benefit from its paired group j. The inter-group interaction when pi j > 0 is shown in Fig.3.
In Table 2, individuals’ payoff of group i are described as follows. Individuals with A genotype(contributors)
promote group’s benefit by sacrificing their own interest. Here, A individuals contribute interest b to their group i
with cost c(b > c). Each individual receives payoff b f Ai from the A individuals. Thus, PA individuals’ payoff is
b f Ai − c, and PN with b f Ai . TA and TN individuals’ payoff is same as PA and PN respectively when a conflict occurs.
However, if two groups are in a harmony status, TA and TN individuals receive another cooperating benefit tmb f Tj
respectively from the T individuals of the paired group j. And t is the benefit from one T individual of group j, m for
group capacity.
Table 1. Probability distribution table when group pi j > 0. column ‘win’ means group i or j winning a conflict with a probability, ‘lose’ for losing
a conflict, ‘tie’ for the conflict ending in a draw. pi j = f PAi − f PAj is the difference between f PAi and f PAj .When pi j = 0, the conflict ends with a tie
directly.
group win lose tie
i 0.5 + 0.5pi j 0.25 − 0.25pi j 0.25 − 0.25pi j
j 0.25 − 0.25pi j 0.5 + 0.5pi j 0.25 − 0.25pi j
4
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Figure 3. Inter-group interaction between group i and j when pi j > 0
2.3.3. The intra-group interaction
In the step of intra-group interaction, individuals will reproduce m new offsprings. One individual can be selected
as a parent according to this individual’ share of the group’s payoff, or say, individuals with greater payoff will have a
greater chance to have more offsprings. The new offsprings mutate in a probability u.
Table 2. Payoff table of group i. n is the number of groups, m for the individuals’ number in each group, d for the ratio of eliminated fighters(PA
individuals) when a conflict occurs, b for altruists contribute to public good at a cost c, t for the benefit of harmonious relation, u for the mutation
probability.
P T
A b f Ai − c b f Ai − c + tm f Tj
N b f Ai b f
A
i + tm f
T
j
2.3.4. The update
In the update part, the new offsprings replace their parental generation, then migrate to other groups randomly.
For the change of identity, it is not necessary to kill individuals if group members change their identities. Here, the
new members who have changed their ethnic identity with probability q migrates to a randomly chosen group.
3. Simulation experiments and results
In this section, we try to validate the proposed viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing
civic identity. To validate this viewpoint, we should firstly test the proposition: that ethnic harmony(ethnic conflicts)
has a positive(negative) association with civic identity. Therefore, we will test whether the frequencies of ethnic
conflicts has a negative correlation with the number of people with civic identity. If the first proposition is wrong, the
viewpoint could be wrong. However, if the proposition is right, secondly we will consider whether it is possible to
keep a consistent peace by cleaning all P individuals or increasing a ratio of T individuals. If the second proposition
is right, the solution for avoiding conflicts are given. However, if the second proposition is wrong, we will search a
possible way to control the frequencies of conflicts in a low level.
5
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Thus, the simulation experiments include three parts: 1)whether the number of people with civic identity has
a positive relation with the level of ethnic harmony(i.e. has negative relation with the frequencies of conflicts);
2)whether it is possible to eliminate conflicts by cleaning P individuals completely, and whether it is possible to
deduce ethnic conflicts by increasing T individuals; 3)how to promote between-groups’ harmonious relationship, i.e.,
how to control the conflict frequency in a low level. The related parameters in the simulations are listed in table 3.
Table 3. Parameters of simulation experiments. n is the number of groups, m for the capacity of each group, d for the ratio of eliminated fighters(PA
individuals) when a conflict occurs, e for the ratio of eliminated individuals in the losing group, b for A individuals contributing benefit to their
group and sacrificing their own benefit c, t for the benefit from one T individual of the paired group when two paired groups are in harmonious
status, u for the new offsprings’ mutation probability, q for new offsprings’ migrating probability.
n m d e b c t u q
18 30 0.2 2.5 0.05 0.03 0.001 0.005 0.2
3.1. The association between the ratio of T individuals and conflicts
In this section, the experiments focus on the association between T and the ratio of conflicts. The variation trend
between the ratio of T individuals and conflicts in 1000 generations are shown in Fig.4. ft is the ratio of T individuals
in one generation, fc for the ratio of occured conflicts. Moreover, the quantitative association between fc and ft of
Fig.4 is listed in table 4.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f t
1001 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
f c
generation
(a) The relation between fc and ft when ft changes in genera-
tion 1-1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
generation
f t
1001 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
generation
f c
(b) The relation between fc and ft when ft changes in genera-
tion 1001-2000
Figure 4. Association between ft and fc. The horizontal axis generation indicates the evolved ith generation. The upper vertical axis ft is the
ratio of T individuals of one generation, and the bottom vertical axis fc for the ratio of occured conflict frequencies account for maximum conflict
frequencies in one generation. The red dot-dash line in the upper panel represents ft , and The blue curve for fc.
Fig.4 shows that ft has a negative correlation with fc. Because the level of fc is low when ft is great in Fig.4(a),
and vice verse for Fig.4(b). Correspondingly, the average value of ft and fc in 200 generations are denoted as ft and
fc in Table 4. The groups in Fig.4(a) are in a harmony status, because fc is very small- around 0.008. Conversely, the
groups in Fig.4(b) are in frequent conflicts because of fc going up to 0.383 maximally.
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Table 4. The quantitative association between fc and ft of Fig.4. Here, Experimentgroups are the simulated results in Fig.4, generations for
continued 200 generations in Fig.4, ft and fc for the average ft and fc in 200 generations respectively.
Experimentgroups generations ft fc
Fig.4(a) 1001-1200 0.937 0.008
Fig.4(a) 1201-1400 0.923 0.002
Fig.4(a) 1401-1600 0.856 0.012
Fig.4(a) 1601-1800 0.782 0.016
Fig.4(a) 1801-2000 0.909 0.002
Fig.4(b) 1001-1200 0.084 0.383
Fig.4(b) 1201-1400 0.065 0.252
Fig.4(b) 1401-1600 0.081 0.297
Fig.4(b) 1601-1800 0.059 0.364
Fig.4(b) 1801-2000 0.056 0.229
3.2. Effect on the ratio of conflicts by cleaning all P or increasing T
From the results in section 3.1, we know that the ratio of T individuals has negative correlation with the ratio
of occured conflicts. So whether is it possible to improve harmonious groups’ relationship by eliminating all P
individuals or increasing T individuals? The following simulation experiments on cleaning all P individuals and
increasing T individuals are shown in Fig.5.
Fig.5 and Table 5 show an interesting phenomenon: the fc will decrease in a short term, but it will bounce back
quickly in a few generations. Thus, in the long generations, it cannot keep the conflicts in a low level by eliminating
all P individuals or increasing T individuals.
Specifically, by eliminating all P individuals in Fig.5(a) in generation 3550, conflicts decrease apparently in the
following a few generations, yet it bounces back in generation 3650. The similar results happened in Fig.5(b) and
Fig.5(c). The decrease of fc in Fig.5(b) is not as apparent as that of in Fig.5(c), because Fig.5(c) increases more
T individuals than Fig.5(b). The average ratio of conflicts before and after the operation(cleaning P or increasing
T) in 100 and 200 generations are listed in table 5. In Table 5, fc1 is the average fc in 100 generations before the
operation, fc2 for the average fc in 100 generations after the operation, fc3 for the average fc in 200 generations after
the operation. In table 5, we can know that fc has a decrease in the following 100 generations and bounce back
again in the next 200 generations. After cleaning all P individuals in generation 3550 in Fig.5(a), fc2 decreases to 0.2
obviously compared with the original average level fc1 = 0.360. Then fc3 increases to 0.35, which is almost close to
the original level. Similarly, fc2 of Fig.5(b) and Fig.5(c) has a slight decrease, and the fc3 of Fig.5(b) bounces back to
the original level nearly. Moreover, fc3 of Fig.5(c) bounces higher compared with the original level.
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(a) Clear all P individuals in generation 3550
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(b) Increase 40% T individuals in generation 3550
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(c) Increase 60% T individuals in generation 3550
Figure 5. The effect on fc by cleaning all P individuals, increasing 40% T, 60% T individuals respectively.
Table 5. The quantified effect on fc with the increasement of T or eliminating P individuals.
Experimentgroups fc1 fc2 fc3
Fig.5(a) 0.360 0.200 0.350
Fig.5(b) 0.372 0.348 0.350
Fig.5(c) 0.385 0.336 0.398
3.3. Increasing T periodically to reduce between-groups’ conflicts
Because of the rebound, the conflict ratio cannot be controlled by the force of increasing T individuals once for all.
What the result will be if we increase more T individuals before the rebounding point? Experiments with increasing
T individuals periodically are shown in Fig.6. Also, the corresponding ft(average ft in 200 generations) are listed in
table 6.
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(a) Increase 40% T individuals periodically each 200 generations
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(b) Increase 40% T individuals periodically each 50 generations
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(c) Increase 60% T individuals periodically each 50 generations
Figure 6. The effect on fc by increasing 40% T, 60% T individuals periodically.
Table 6. The quantified effect on fc with the increase or decrease of ft
Experimentgroups generations ft fc
Fig.6(a) 5001-5200 0.280 0.344
Fig.6(a) 5201-5400 0.269 0.317
Fig.6(a) 5401-5600 0.336 0.346
Fig.6(a) 5601-5800 0.257 0.368
Fig.6(a) 5801-6000 0.377 0.315
Fig.6(b) 5001-5200 0.477 0.281
Fig.6(b) 5201-5400 0.367 0.314
Fig.6(b) 5401-5600 0.359 0.294
Fig.6(b) 5601-5800 0.552 0.243
Fig.6(b) 5801-6000 0.560 0.249
Fig.6(c) 5001-5200 0.97 0.001
Fig.6(c) 5201-5400 0.964 0.005
Fig.6(c) 5401-5600 0.945 0.004
Fig.6(c) 5601-5800 0.966 0.001
Fig.6(c) 5801-6000 0.957 0.004
In Fig.6, we increase 40% and 60% T individuals every 200 and 50 generations respectively. From Fig.6(a) and
Fig.6(b), we can see that fc bounce back with the period, because the period is too long or the increased T individuals
are not enough, or both. But we can control fc in a low level by increasing T individuals before the bounce. In
Fig.6(c), the fc keeps in a very low level by increasing 60% T individuals each 50 generations. By this way, the fc of
Fig.6(c) is no more than 0.05, and it is the smallest in the three figures.
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So, under the same increasement of T individuals, the smaller the period the lower level of fc is. Moreover, under
the same period, the lager the ft then the lower level of fc is.
3.4. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we will analyze the effect on f ′c and f ′t under different parameters. f ′c and f ′t are the average value
of fc and ft in 10000 generations. In the simulations, we change one parameter and fix other parameters, and the
simulations are listed in Fig.7. From Fig.7, we can see that the value of f ′c (or f ′t ) could be fluctuant when the value
of one parameter changes. However, the responding f ′c is small when f ′t become great. So the negative association
between the frequencies of conflicts and the number of T individuals still holds. Therefore, the other two conclusions
in section 3.2 and 3.3 that base on the negative association also hold.
Specifically, parameters m(group’s capacity), c(altruists’ sacrificed benefit), q(migrating probability) and t(the
benefit from the paired group’s T individuals under harmonious status) affect f ′c and f ′t a lot. In Fig.7(a),(e),(f),(h),
when m, c, q and t become large, the corresponding f ′c tend to be small. The reasons are stated as follows: when m
is large, the probability of leading to a conflict becomes small because of the large population base; when c becomes
large, the f ′c become small because the number of T individuals will increase(the PA individuals’ fitness become
small); when q is large, the f ′c become small because the conflicts occur with a low probability; when t is large,
individuals tend to be friendly with other groups, then the f ′c will become small. On the contrast, when b becomes
large, the f ′c tend to become large. Because the large population of altruists could increase the number of fighters(PA
individuals). The change of other parameters d,e and u have no direct association with the increase or decrease of f ′c .
The simulations enlighten us that it also exists other possible ways to decrease the frequencies of conflicts. For
examples, conflicts could be decreased by increasing the chances of communication between groups(increasing q), or
by promoting the groups’ cooperating benefit(increasing t) etc..
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Figure 7. Sensitive analysis of Parameters.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we established an evolutionary game model, and simulated the relationship between civic identity
and ethnic conflicts by the evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicated that ethnic conflicts cannot
be avoided by just killing the ultranationalist. Though the ratio of individuals with civic identity had a negative
association with the ratio of ethnic conflicts, ethnic conflicts cannot be kept in a low level in a long term just by
promoting civic identity, because the ration of conflicts may bounce back. However, the frequency of conflicts could
stay in a low level by propelling civic identity persistently and periodically.
Indicated by the simulation results, we have known that it is possible to control ethnic conflicts in a low level
by promoting civic identity. However, to predict ethnic conflicts is still a challenge, because it is hard to collect
the historical datasets about ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts. The effects of popularizing civic identity on ethnic
groups’ culture, language are still needed to explore. Moreover, this work spawns some interesting problems. Can the
evolution of national languages be studied by the methodology of natural science- evolutionary theory and stimulation
technology? What the interesting findings can be found by studying the evolutionary of language with evolutionary
theory and stimulation technology? What’s more, the study in this paper could supply an example for studying ethnic
problems by the methodology of natural science.
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